Saturday – July 22
Panel on Hume & Asian Philosophy
Rico Vitz
Dobin Choi
I examine Hume’s and Mengzi’s reliance on aesthetic and moral taste in their sentiment-based theories of virtue. The views of each philosopher on taste appear to conflict. In his essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” Hume observes that people’s taste sentiments appear to vary, but he seeks a standard that prevents skepticism about taste. In contrast, in Mengzi 6A7, Mengzi directly focuses on the uniformity of taste and argues that human nature requires that we share universal moral preferences. I argue that, given their philosophical goals, the apparent contrast in their views originates from their attending to different aspects of taste. For his empirical account of aesthetic evaluation, Hume observes the ordinary phenomena of taste, people’s varied particular sentiments; he then investigates their initial causes in the mind to determine a reliable standard. Mengzi takes the cases of uniform taste sentiments to imply their identical mental cause of our moral taste, which is the cornerstone of moral self-cultivation. Despite their seemingly conflicting approaches to taste, both philosophers reach similar conclusions: they recognize a practical standard of taste in those who have achieved excellence in their aesthetic and moral taste, but suggest that the ultimate standard of taste is the natural constitution of the human mind.
Yumiko Inukai
Keynote: Donald Ainslie ‘The Passions of David Hume’
Saturday Concurrent Sessions
10A Speaker: Brandon Ascione – ‘A Passion for Regression:
The Psychology of Hume’s Skepticism at THN 1.4.1’
T 1.4.1 contains what appears to be a skeptical regressive argument that ultimately leads to a complete loss of belief. Yet, Hume claims that neither he nor anyone else is compelled by this argument because like breathing, it is the nature of humans to form beliefs. Thus, it becomes challenging to understand why anyone would engage in such a skeptical thought process from the start. Drawing on Peter Millican’s critique of this iterating skepticism and Donald Ainslie’s interpretive work on T 1.4.1, it becomes clear that there is disagreement over what Hume’s intended purposes for T 1.4.1 might be. This paper argues that T 1.4.1 is an account of the psychology of a particular kind of skeptical disposition. Hume’s work on the passions can account and explain the psychology of the skeptic with this skeptical disposition. By taking a more holistic analysis of passages from Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise and citing Margaret Watkins’ conception of delicacy of passion, a compelling case is made that Hume’s own skeptical crisis from T 1.4.7 was motivated by such a skeptical disposition that was driven by the passion of fear.
10B Speaker: Åsa Carlson – ‘Paragraph T 3.2.1.8, Hume’s Circle, and the Argument from Motivation’
Hume thought that morality motivates action. This is evident from his so-called motivation argument: since morality motivates action, morality cannot be the product of reason alone. He also states that, “All morality depends upon our sentiments” (T 3.2.5.4). Thus, the moral phenomena that produce or prevent action should be identical with or the products of moral sentiments. Commentators find Hume’s text incoherent. Moral sentiments are about characters or motives, not about actions. So how does morality motivate action? The key to understanding this is not as commonly believed T 3.2.1.8, but Hume’s circle in T 3.2.1.7. To avoid circularity, he distinguishes between natural motives (virtues) and moral motives (sense of duty). Moral motives arise from natural motives in combination with moral sentiments. While moral sentiments are felt from an impartial perspective, sense of duty is experienced by the agent. Because of this, the object of sense of duty is an action, not a character or mental trait. The function of morality is to make up for faint virtues.
11A Speaker: Ronald Wilburn – From Study to Parlour – Dancing the Humean Slide Beliefs’
Hume famously transitions between skepticism and naturalism (which I take here to be little more than common sense conviction concerning external things and the deliberations of reason). The most common analysis of this phenomenon maintains that Hume’s skepticism fails to mesmerize for long for merely psychological reasons. Such accounts, however, fail to justify Hume’s epistemic shifts.
Michael Williams more interesting, rationalizing, account of Hume’s transitions between study and parlor is a contextualist response that aims to defuse Hume’s seeming bispectival shift from self-professed ignorance to presumed knowledge by critiquing the assumption that there is a single univocal concept of “knowledge,” corresponding to a single invariant knowledge relation, through which differently contexted epistemic outlooks can be compared.
Herein, I critique Williams’ approach by asking if it captures the full range of legitimate concerns that Hume displays in his transitions between study and parlor? After describing several reasons to favor this view, all concerning its advantages over vulgar forms of pragmatism, I offer three conclusive reasons to reject it.
11B Speaker: Peter Millican – ‘Hume on Free Will and Moral Responsibility’
David Hume’s views on morality – the topic of both Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature (1740), and of his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) – are widely familiar and much discussed, but his view of moral responsibility is far less well known, and even rather obscure. To piece this view together, we must examine his theory of intentional agency, which – in the tradition of Thomas Hobbes – he expounds under the heading “Of Liberty and Necessity”. But there are significant discrepancies between his discussions of this topic in Book 2 of the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). And his theory has been widely misunderstood for a number of reasons, including confusion about his theory of causal necessity, and a tendency to view his thought through the lens of subsequent writers in the tradition of empiricist compatibilism. So although Hume’s writings “of liberty and necessity” are amongst the most widely known in the philosophical canon, achieving a reliable interpretation of his settled opinion on these topics – and on the closely related topic of moral responsibility – requires careful analysis.